Saturday, November 9, 2019
Case Study. Champion Essay
CASE: Rebhan v. Pop Warner Little Scholars, INC FACTS: Gator Rebhan is the former head coach of Suniland Sundevils. They were two time National Champions, including a victoy of 56-6 in the championship game. That following week, Pop Warner suspended Rebhan indefinitely alleging he intentionally ran up the score, which is a violation of Pop Warner rules. Rebhan filed a suit claiming that Pop Warner did not follow their own rules, in two instances. First, the referees failed to reward the ball to the opponents after each score until the deficit was less than 36. Rebhan was also never contacted or interviewed by Pop Warner to get his side of the story. ISSUE: Was Pop Warner within its rights to suspend Rebhan for running up the score, without hearing from him first? HOLDING: According to ââ¬Å"We Own This Gameâ⬠, Gator Rebhan dropped his lawsuit against Pop Warner in the following year. RATIONALE: Although the suit was dropped, Rebhan did hold a very strong case to be reinstated. Pop Warner broke its own league rules by not interviewing him prior to his suspension. Had they done so, they might have come to a different conclusion after he argued that he was trying to protect his own players after the opposing team stacked the box with 11 men. They might also realize that had the officials done their part correctly, Rebhanââ¬â¢s team would never have been rewarded the ball after the deficit reached greater than 36. According to ââ¬Å"We Own This Gameâ⬠, Rebhanââ¬â¢s suspension expired, and there was no reason for him to follow through with the case. Gator Rebhan was allowed to coach the Suniland Sundevils for the following season.
Thursday, November 7, 2019
7 Steps to Becoming a Self-Made Millionaire
7 Steps to Becoming a Self-Made Millionaire So you want to be a millionaire, but you donââ¬â¢t come from money and you donââ¬â¢t have much to build on. It is possible, but it will take an awful lot of work. The first question you want to ask yourself is why this is important to you. The correct answer usually isnââ¬â¢t ââ¬Å"I just want to be rich.â⬠Think about what matters to you and what your dreams are, and focus on those instead of the dollar amount in your bank account.Here are a few ways you could give it a try.1. Work HarderIf you want to be a self-made miracle success story, youââ¬â¢re going to have to work and study a lot harder than everybody else. Youââ¬â¢re going to have to constantly push yourself- never let yourself get complacent, stop learning, or cease seeking out new challenges. Make to-do lists and complete them. Then make new ones.2. ReadReading is the number one thing you can do to boost your chances of success. Youââ¬â¢ll get new ideas, stay on the cutting edge of every conversati on, and generally just stay smart and sharp. Which, if you want to be a millionaire, is what youââ¬â¢ll need to do. Grow your knowledge and skill base as widely as possible. Develop interests and pursue those interests doggedly. Be the best at something.3. Find a MentorYou should already be surrounding yourself with successful, like-minded people. Itââ¬â¢s great to shift your own outlook and build some momentum. But take care to single out a mentor. Yours could be a parent, teacher, career mentor, yourself, or even a character in a book. The point is to choose someone you admire, whom you can emulate and become more successful in the process.4. Donââ¬â¢t Waste TimeFrom now on, your time is money. Donââ¬â¢t invest your time in anything not worth the effort. And cut back on your television and social media intake. If you keep your YouTube video watching habits and other screen time down to an hour a day, imagine how much more you could get done.5. Be a Good PersonDonââ¬â ¢t just aim to be rich in money; aim to be rich in spirit. Tip well. Listen attentively. Give to those less fortunate than you and be sure to take time to care for your loved ones. The pursuit of success can often be a lonely one- donââ¬â¢t leave your family and friends behind. And be sure to give back wherever possible. Your soul is as important as your bank account.6. See the Big PictureDonââ¬â¢t just focus on your short-term success and set lofty goals for the yearââ¬â¢s end. Focus on the bigger picture of how you want your life to be shaped. Keep your eye on the biggest, most motivating prize and let yourself be continually driven and inspired.7. Live FrugallyYou sometimes have to spend money to make money. But that doesnââ¬â¢t mean you should spend whatever you make. Try to live as humbly as possible while you amass the cash youââ¬â¢ll need to take yourself to the next level.
Tuesday, November 5, 2019
A Biography of Notorious Auschwitz Doctor Josef Mengele
A Biography of Notorious Auschwitz Doctor Josef Mengele Josef Mengele (March 16, 1911 - February 7, 1979) was a Nazi SS doctor who experimented on twins, dwarves, and others at the Auschwitz Concentration Camp during the Holocaust. Although Mengele looked kind and handsome, his heinous, pseudoscientific medical experiments, often performed on young children, has placed Mengele as one of the most villainous and notorious Nazis. At the end of World War II, Mengele escaped capture and is believed to have died in Brazil 34 years later. Early Life Born March 16, 1911, in Gà ¼nzburg, GermanyParents were Karl (1881-1959) and Walburga (d. 1946), MengeleTwo younger brothers: Karl (1912-1949) and Alois (1914-1974)Nickname was Beppo1926 diagnosed with osteomyelitis Education and Beginning of WWII 1930 graduated from the GymnasiumMarch 1931 joined the Steel Helmuts (Stahlhelm)January 1934 SA absorbed StahlhelmOctober 1934 left SA because of kidney trouble1935 awarded Ph.D. from the University of MunichJanuary 1, 1937, appointed a research assistant at the Third Reich Institute for Heredity, Biology, and Racial Purity at the University of Frankfurt; worked with Professor Otmar Freiherr von VershuerMay 1937 joined the NSDAP (member #5574974)May 1938 admitted to the SSJuly 1938 awarded medical degree by University of FrankfurtOctober 1938 began basic training with the Wehrmacht (lasted three months)July 1939 married Irene SchoenbeinJune 1940 joined the medical corps (Sanittsinspektion) of the Waffen SSAugust 1940 appointed an Untersturmfà ¼hrerAttached to Genealogical Section of the Race and Resettlement Office in occupied PolandJune 1941, sent to Ukraine as part of the Waffen SS; received the Iron Cross, Second ClassJanuary 1942 joined the Waffen SSs Viking Division medical cor ps; earned the Iron Cross, First Class by pulling two soldiers out of a burning tank while under enemy fire; also awarded the Black Badge for the Wounded and the Medal for the Care of the German People; wounded End of 1942 reposted to the Race and Resettlement Office, this time in its headquarters in Berlinappointed to Haupsturmfà ¼hrer (captain) Auschwitz May 30, 1943, arrived at AuschwitzConducted medical experiments onà twins, dwarfs, giants, and many othersSeemingly constant presence and participation in the selections at the rampResponsible for selections in the womens campcalled Angele of DeathMarch 11, 1944, his son, Rolf, was bornSometime middle of January 1945, he fled Auschwitz On the Run Arrived at Gross-Rosen camp; then left before Russians liberated it on February 11, 1945Spotted at MauthausenCaptured as a prisoner of war and held in a POW camp near MunichReceived papers from fellow prisoner, Dr. Fritz Ulmann; for vanity reasons had not gotten blood type tattooed beneath arm, American Army did not realize he was a member of the SS and released himAliases include: Fritz Ullmann, Fritz Hollmann, Helmut Gregor, G. Helmuth, Jose Mengele, Ludwig Gregor, Wolfgang GerhardRemained on George Fischers farm for three years1949 escaped to Argentina1954 his father came to visit him1954 divorced from Irene1956 had his name officially changed to Josef Mengele1958 married his brother, Karls, widow - Martha MengeleJune 7, 1959, West Germany issued its first arrest warrant for Mengele1959 moved to Paraguay1964 the Universities of Frankfurt and Munich withdrew his academic degreesAssumed that his remains were buried in Embu, Brazil in a grave marked Wolfgang GerhardBelieved to have d ied on February 7, 1979, on the beach at Bertioga in Embu, Brazil while suffering a stroke while swimming in the ocean. February 1985 a public trial, in absentia, was held at Yad VashemIn June 1985, the body in the grave was exhumed for forensic identification.
Saturday, November 2, 2019
Cooperate Social Responsibility Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words
Cooperate Social Responsibility - Assignment Example Still, on social responsibility in regards to human resource, it is important to highlight that Etisalat Company has created a department within the company that helps in the provision of solutions to various persons in the company either internally or externally. In this, it can solve external problems that could possibly involve the company with the customers, another company or organization at the same time the department can help in the giving of solutions to the employee's problems themselves and with the management for example on the salaries and wages. This is a very crucial department in the Company as the relationship between Etisalat Company, government, customers and other organizations are very key to the success of the company and like it is always said that the customer is always the king, good relationship with the customers is the key to success and this is because the customers feel that their problems and concerns are catered for by the company (Mark, 2011). Ã Environmental conservation is a very delicate matter in every nation and even to the whole world due to the fact that there are several environment conservation and protection bodies that push for the protection of the environment. Etisalat Company is not left out in the protection of the environment as well. The company employs the reusing of substances especially plastic.
Thursday, October 31, 2019
Building and constructions Communication systems Essay
Building and constructions Communication systems - Essay Example In the building, over 550 fibre optic data cables are running from the MDF which provides the ability to virtually access any room in the building. The fibre optic cable used in the building is half lucent laser-speed multimode fibre and half lucent single-mode fibre. In the building more than 45,000 meters of fibre optic cable used. This cabling enables each computer to have a 10,000 megabit per second (10Gigabit) connection speed. In the building, there are approximately 450 telephone lines that end into the MDF telephone cubes, with about 60 kilometres of lucent Giga-speed cables.Telstra, the main telephone service provider in Australia also handles the telephone services for the interpro building and the VOIP is not implemented yet. The computer network in the interpro building is based on 540 desktop computers. The network also gives wireless access to interpro network via three wireless routers distributed in each floor of the building. These wireless routers give access to more than 800 wireless devices such as PDAs, laptops or cell phones. Computers are originally in the network but they can also be unplugged if necessary. Wireless routers have an adapter which allows a cable from the LAN to be plugged in. There are also several output ports for cables which can be connected to the rest of the LAN. Each of these wireless routers support 255 wireless devices and has a unique security setting to prevent the damage to the whole building network if a hacker entered the LAN through a wireless router. All access points are equipped with firewall software that controls the flow of data. There is also a monitoring system that shows the status of the network for each floor. The interpro company's building has three floors and each floor uses a separate LAN for security issues. These LANS are connected to each other and they form a small WAN. The whole network is based on cable LAN and wireless LAN. The building has three servers which all the data for each floor is passed by. There are 400 hub-switch provided links in the LANs and as stated before, there are three wireless routers which provide the wireless access for wireless devices both to the building network and the Internet. At the first floor, there is a main server room which has a cavity for cable runs. Each floor at the company has a star topology and all the devices are connected to the main server. Each server on each floor has a bus topology to access two other servers at other floors and the main DSL cable which enters to the building connects to the bus network after the data enters through a firewall. References Interpro, company overview, viewed on November 22, 2007.
Tuesday, October 29, 2019
History of Measurment Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words
History of Measurment - Essay Example The Egyptians were not able to monopolize the measuring system. The Babylonians also devised measures stemming from a cubit, though 6 mm longer than that of the Egyptians. This cubit was then divided into 30 kus, roughly equal to a digit. The earliest known decimal system is the Harappan system; from 2500 B.C. to 1700 B.C. Evidence suggests that they had two different series of weights. One system was based on a measurement of the Indus inch (1.32 modern inches). Since their system was based on base-10, ten Indus inches equaled 13.2 inches, the measure of a foot. The other scale was discovered in the form of a bronze rod with markings of 0.367 in. 100 units of that would be 36.7 inches, approximately the length of a stride. Measurements of the Harappan ruins show that they used these measurements extremely accurately. European systems of measurement were based on the Roman system. The Romans, in turn, borrowed their measurements from the Greeks, who had based it on the Babylonians and the Egyptians. Their base unit was the breadth of a finger. Unlike the other cultures, they only had three widely used units of measurement: the finger, the foot and the Greek cubit. The Greeks also standardized weight by stabilizing the size of containers to weigh goods and by creating a standard set of measures. The Romans changed the Greek system slightly, by creating the pace, equal to five feet. Thousand paces was a Roman mile, extraordinarily close to the modern British mile. It was in 1672, that Sir Isaac Newton actually made a vital discovery about the "Newton Rings" which actually used light to measure distances. Neither he nor the world at large understood the great implications of it, and today "interferometry" as it is called helps measure precise distances to within millionths of an inch or a millimeter. The French, on the other hand, used a bewildering array of measures. Standardization was a big problem since no one could come to an agreement. As late as 1788 Arthur Young wrote in "Travels during the years 1787, 1788, 1789" published in 1793, "In France the infinite perplexity of the measures exceeds all comprehension. They differ not only in every province, but also in every district and almost every town". The English though tried to standardize as early as in the 13th century, by England issuing a royal ordinance "Assize of Weights and Measures" to bring some unity. Wren had proposed a new system based on the yard defined as the length of a pendulum beating at the rate of one second in the Tower of London. Britain and Scotland uniting ensured a better prevalence for the system but it was hard when each province wanted its own system followed. In 1824, the English Parliament legalized the yard that was first proposed in 1760. In 1870 the French in Paris convened an International Conference with the aim of improving international scientific cooperation by having the metric system as the worldwide standard. This resulted in seventeen nations signing up and later a few more nations joining in and kind of standardized the metric system. US though were influenced by the colonists who brought with various measurements from their places of origin and for a long time it was an array of measurements. In 1821 John Quincy Adam for the first person to propose to the
Sunday, October 27, 2019
The Rise in Penal Populism | Dissertation
The Rise in Penal Populism | Dissertation Abstract Since the mid-1970s onward, the vast majority of Western countries have experienced a significant plus continual rise in their incarceration rates, leading to the problem of overcrowded prisons. We examine the extent to which the ââ¬Ëincarceration boomââ¬â¢ of many modern societies can be attributed to the phenomenon of penal populism. Specifically, we argue that some short-lived actual crime waves during the late 1970s and 1980s may have initially generated a small amount of rational penal populist sentiment among the public, it is the strong divisions within the increasingly heterogeneous public (both politically and ethnically), the central government, and the popular media industry of many democratic developed nations which have ultimately sustained the growth of both penal populism and prison population numbers. Furthermore, we focus on the types of crime that are most commonly targeted by strong penal populist sentiments in the public and criminal justice system, and suggest that all such categories of crime can be fundamentally linked to the cultural ââ¬Ëpurificationââ¬â¢ of children which has taken place in virtually all Western societies during the latter half of the twentieth century. Finally, we consider the limitations of penal populism, referring to those few post-industrial states where such populist punitiveness has been largely resisted, and postulate what the end-stage consequences of a penal populist movement spanning over the past three decades are likely to be. 1. Introduction The term ââ¬Ëpenal populismââ¬â¢ denotes a punitive phenomenon that has become characteristic of many modern industrial societies, especially within Western liberal democracies since the late twentieth century onward, whereby anti-crime political pressure groups, talk-back radio hosts, victimââ¬â¢s rights activists or lobbyists, and others who claim to represent the ââ¬Ëordinary publicââ¬â¢ have increasingly demanded of their governments that harsher policies and punishments be enforced by the relevant organs of the criminal justice system (e.g. law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, legislators, etc.) in order to combat the perceived rise in serious crime rates (Pratt, 2006). One direct consequence of the increasingly severe ââ¬Ëtough on crimeââ¬â¢ measures ââ¬â such as ââ¬ËLife means Lifeââ¬â¢, ââ¬ËThree Strikesââ¬â¢, and ââ¬ËZero Toleranceââ¬â¢ policies ââ¬â exercised in many economically advanced countries from the mid-1970s onward has been an unprecedented rapid rise in the incarceration rates of these respective nations, leading to the problem of overcrowded prisons. The United States epitomises the tempo of the modern change in national imprisonment rates, and currently has the worst problem of prison overcrowding on a global scale. Indeed, ââ¬ËAmerican incarceration numbers [have] increased fivefold between 1973 and 1997ââ¬â¢(Caplow and Simon, 1999, p63). More recently, ââ¬Ëin 2004 the United States surpassed Russia in incarceration rates to become the world leader. With 2.2 million individuals inside (assuming a U.S. population of 290 million in 2004, that is an incarceration rate of approximately 759 adults in prison per 100,000 residents of the United States) and upwards of 7 million individuals either on parole, probation or awaiting trial, 1 in every 33 people in the U.S. is currently under state control and the number is growingââ¬â¢(State-Wide Harm Reduction Coalition, 2005). Clearly, an interpretation of the widespread incarceration rise must be able to accurately explain its rapidity, extent, and endurance on a global scale. There are two principal explanations for why such a large number of developed countries have experienced an ââ¬Ëincarceration boomââ¬â¢ over the past three decades. Both theoretical models assert that it is changes in penal policies plus sentencing practices, rather than simply significant increases in crime rates alone, which are the primary factor responsible for driving prison population growth, but there is considerable disparity between the two theories about the causes of penal policy changes. One ââ¬Ëcrime waveââ¬â¢ hypothesis posits that actual rising crime rates in many Western countries, including the vast expansion of drug crime during the late twentieth century, have resulted in a greater rational public demand for the criminal justice system to take more severe punitive measures against convicted dangerous criminals (i.e. those offenders who pose the highest threat to public safety and social order; the criminal offenders most commonly targeted by penal populism in modern societies shall be considered in detail below), such as a more frequent use of incarceration with longer custodial sentences. In contrast, the second ââ¬Ëpolitical opportunismââ¬â¢ hypothesis suggests that many majority government parties have intentionally overstated the size and severity of the national crime problem in order to heighten public fears or instil ââ¬Ëmoral panicââ¬â¢ over perceived (as opposed to actual) rising crime rates, which are merely a political artefact, and subsequently utilise harsher crime control policies to win electoral favour (Caplow and Simon, 1999). Importantly, irrespective of which mechanism has in actual fact been operating across numerous advanced industrial states, and has led to the observed excessive growth in prison population sizes, both explanatory models can clearly be regarded as strongly related to the presence of penal populism. The critical difference between the two theories is whether the main original source of those penal populist sentiments can be accurately considered to be the public or the state, or both. According to the first model, which may be described as the public-induced penal populism hypothesis, it has been the persistent public demand for the government to impose harsher punitive measures on convicted criminals which has primarily caused the fast-paced escalation of incarceration numbers in many modern nations. In other words, the criminal justice systems in these countries have largely been exercising a regime of penal excess because constant pressure from a large sector of the public (in response to an actual rise in crime rates) has compelled them to do so. In comparison, the second model, which we may refer to as the state-induced penal populism hypothesis, postulates that within many Western countries the government parties in power have often created and sustained an artificial appearance of rising crime rates in order to instil widespread public anxiety. Subsequently, the majority government (and individual politicians) can be observed by the public to be apparently controlling the perceived illusory crime problem, such as through adopting and enforcing ââ¬Ëtough on crimeââ¬â¢ measures, and thereby attain public popularity to secure their partyââ¬â¢s (or their own) success in the next general election. The second model further suggests that the government is not the only state institution in developed nations which benefits from overstating the scale of the dangerous crime threat, but that there are also large rewards for popular media outlets or news companies willing to do so. It is argued by many criminologists that within almost all democratic Western countries, the central government and the popular media, which are both fragmented into multiple competing partyââ¬â¢s or companies, are highly dependent on addressing and reporting criminal activity that specifically victimises ââ¬Ëordinary peopleââ¬â¢ in order to retain electoral votes and public ratings, respectively. Hence, the state-induced penal populism hypothesis proposes that politicians and media outlets lead rather than merely follow or passively represent the public opinion: the public only supports or appears to ââ¬Ëdemandââ¬â¢ the governmentââ¬â¢s harsher punitive policy strategies because the same national government and popular media industry (as two powerful state institutions) have manufactured a compelling false image of prevalent serious crime which has instilled strong penal populist sentiments in a large proportion of that public. The central aim of the following examination is to determine which of these two distinctive theoretical positions is most likely to be correct. It is of course possible that the public-induced penal populism mechanism primarily operates in one developed nation, while in another Western country it may be the state-driven penal populism process that is predominant. However, to the extent that the relatively recent phenomenon of globalisation has resulted in many common economic, social, political, and cultural practices being widely adopted by a number of modern industrial states, one may plausibly expect a similar (if not identical) mechanism of generating penal populism to be present in the developed nations affected by prison population growth, especially with regard to the United States and Western Europe. At the outset, we may hypothesise that although some short-lived real increases in Western crime rates during the late 1970s and 1980s may have initially triggered some rational penal populist sentiments among the public of these modern societies, it has been the combined interaction of both political opportunism and media opportunism which has acted as a powerful vehicle in numerous modern societies for distorting the publicââ¬â¢s common view of the national crime problem, and ultimately for sustaining the growth of both penal populism plus prison populations, regardless of how those crime rates may have subsequently changed (and in most developed countries they have steadily declined). One fundamental feature of the modern incarceration surge over the past three decades that is observed in virtually all countries affected by rapid prison growth is the significant proportion of these prison populations that has become comprised of racial minorities, including both of resident ethnic groups and of non-citizen illegal immigrants. As one study (Oââ¬â¢Donnell, 2004, p262) remarks, ââ¬Ëone factor that accounts for rising prison populations across Europe is the incarceration of ââ¬Ëforeignersââ¬â¢. It is likely that prison accommodation in the Republic of Ireland will be used to hold growing numbers of failed asylum seekers, at least pending deportation. It is also inevitable that the composition of the prison population will change as members of minority groups begin to appear before the courts on criminal chargesââ¬â¢. In terms of the racial minorities imprisonment trend in the United States, Caplow and Simon (1999, p66) assert that ââ¬Ëit is undeniable that the incarcerated population is disproportionately composed of minorities (especially African Americans and Hispanics), and that the disproportion has increased during the period of rising imprisonmentThe period of rapid growth in incarceration rates has seen a significant increase in the proportion of minorities in the inmate population, especially among drug offenders, the fastest growing segment of that [prison] populationââ¬â¢. As is the case with most Western European countries, the United States prison sector has also experienced a mass round up of illegal immigrants or non-citizens during the last three decades, who in 2003 made up 40% of federal prisoners (State-Wide Harm Reduction Coalition, 2005). Ultimately, therefore, it is apparent that the incarceration boom in many developed countries has primarily affected various racial minority populations present within these nations. It is the cumulative incarceration of racial minorities that is significantly responsible for the prison overcrowding problem commonly observed. Thus, one crucial question that we must address in the following study is what has caused (and continues to cause) the increased imprisonment of racial minority populations, relative to the incarceration rate of the racial majority host population (typically white), within the modern industrial societies affected by prison overcrowding? Specifically, we shall seek to determine whether pervasive ââ¬Ëpenal racismââ¬â¢, indicated by a greater tendency in developed nations for both the law enforcement system to arrest and subsequently for the criminal justice system to imprison ethnic or non-white defendants compared with white ones who have committed the same offence, is sufficient to explain the large racial differentials observed in incarceration rates, or not. The methodology of the following study consists entirely of literature-based research and analysis. 2. The Origins of Penal Populism: Real Crime Waves versus Political and Media Opportunism It is widely acknowledged that the prevalent public sentiment in many developed countries to ââ¬Ëget toughââ¬â¢ with criminals has played a central role in catalysing the incarceration surge which has occurred in these nations since the mid-1970s onward, an influential social movement that is referred to as penal populism. Furthermore, whether one regards the source of that penal populism as stemming from a rational public response to actual rising crime rates or, conversely, as triggered by public exposure to political and media manipulation, the measured strength of the publicââ¬â¢s demand on their respective democratic governments to impose harsher punitive measures on convicted criminals has remained consistently high over the thirty year period of vast growth in incarceration numbers. For example, with regard to the United States, one study notes that the time series of public responses to the survey question of whether courts are too lenient has remained highly stable since 1972 (Caplow and Simon, 1999). The significant temporal correlation in many modern industrial states between the onset of strong public desire since around the mid-1970s for more stringent crime policies and the period of rapid prison population growth is a clear indication of the vital part that penal populist sentiments have played in causing prison overcrowding. One may plausibly argue that the strong growth of penal populist sentiments in most advanced industrial societies over the past three decades has been initially generated by temporary real increases in crime (including the rapid expansion of a drug-crime economy during the 1980s) and sustained by an increased reliance of governments on implementing harsher crime control measures (rather than more effective social welfare policies) to gain public support plus secure electoral favour. Accordingly, we intend to demonstrate that penal populism in developed nations is a product of both short-lived actual crime waves and manipulative political opportunism. Indeed, one would theoretically expect the two factors operating in conjunction to result in a significantly larger escalation in incarceration rates (as is in fact observed) than would occur if only one of these forces was present in isolation. As one study has observed, ââ¬Ëtough on crimeââ¬â¢ policies produce prison population increases only to the degree that offenders are available to be imprisoned (Zimring and Hawkins, 1991). Conversely, an increase in crime rates would also not produce a corresponding increase in imprisonment rates unless some suitably punitive crime control measures were in place. During the last thirty years there has also certainly occurred in many Western countries a greater dependence of competing popular media companies, both television and the press, on selectively reporting dangerous (i.e. worse than normal) crime on an almost daily basis, simply in order to maintain or increase viewer and reader ratings. By portraying the national crime problem as more severe and more prevalent than in reality, individual popular media outlets (e.g. tabloid newspapers) in developed nations have become more appealing to public viewers than their quality media counterparts (e.g. broadsheet newspapers) who often object to distorting or manipulating the reporting of crime news. Since the late twentieth century onward, crime news has become a fundamental component of the publicââ¬â¢s staple diet. As Pratt (2007, p68) suggests, ââ¬Ëthe reporting of crime is inherently able to shock [and] entertain, sustaining public appeal and interest, selling newspapers and increasing television audiences. Furthermore, the way in which crime is used to achieve these ends is by selective rather than comprehensive reportingHowever, it is not only that crime reporting has quantitatively increased; there have also been qualitative changes in its reporting: it is prone to focus more extensively on violent and sexual crime than in the pastThese qualitative and quantitative changes in crime reporting can be attributed to the growing diversity of news sources and media outletsAs a consequence, both television and the press have to be much more competitive than used to be the case. Their programmes have to be packaged in such a way that they become more attractive to viewers than those of their rivals and competitorsââ¬â¢. Evidently, given that it is typically the most popular newspapers (such as the tabloid press in Britain) which feature the greatest number and severity of crime stories, it means that the most common representations of crime, portrayed in ââ¬Ëthe form of randomised, unpredictable and violent attacks inevitably committed by strangers on ââ¬Ëordinary peopleââ¬â¢, reach the greatest audienceââ¬â¢(Pratt, 2007, p70). Thus, it is clear that within modern society the potential benefits to popular media outlets from inaccurately amplifying the danger plus scale of national crime in the publicââ¬â¢s perception are equally as large as the rewards for politicians willing to do so. With regard to addressing the (largely fabricated) immediacy of the criminal activity problem, therefore, media opportunism and political opportunism are proximately linked in virtually all post-industrial countries where penal populist currents are strongly established. As well as magnifying the size of the dangerous crime problem, the popular media in many Western countries further continually seeks to undermine the current sentencing practices of the criminal justice system, regardless of how harsh they have become over the past three decades. In the same way that the crime stories reported by the popular media are scarcely representative of the actual nature of everyday crime within developed nations, the court stories followed are rarely illustrative of everyday sentencing practices. According to Pratt (2007), that media misrepresentation then reinforces the common public opinion that courts are too lenient, even though they have become significantly more punitive, in addition to fuelling the widely held public sentiment that the crime rate is constantly escalating when recent statistics indicate that crime is in fact steadily declining in most modern societies. Thus, in its reporting style, crime analysis by the Western popular media has become ââ¬Ëpersonalisedââ¬â¢ rather than ââ¬Ëstatisticalisedââ¬â¢, since: 1) it prioritises the experiences of ordinary people (especially crime victims) over expert opinions 2) News reports are more prone to focus on the occasional failings of criminal justice officials as opposed to their many successes. Indeed, in the vast majority of modern societies, the ââ¬Ëcitation of criminal statistics has become a code for softness on crime and callousness towards its victimsââ¬â¢(Pratt, 2007, p88), which simply provides the popular media with further scope to legitimately overstate the scale and severity of everyday crime in developed states. For these reasons, the media outlets in many Western countries have played a significant role in facilitating the continual growth of penal populist sentiments among the public. 3. The Transient Growth of a Drug-Crime Economy in Developed Countries It is highly pertinent that the vast expansion in drug crime within many Western nations during the late 1970s and 1980s coincided precisely with the onset of rapidly escalating incarceration rates in these same countries. As is asserted, ââ¬Ëthe growth in nondrug crime has simply not been sufficient to sustain the rapid growth of imprisonment. By the 1970s there was already an active culture of drug use and networks of drug importation/sales in the United States, but their economic importance increased in the 1980s due to new products and distribution strategies, especially for ââ¬Ëcrackââ¬â¢ cocaine. That transformation in the marketing of illegal drugs coincided with political decisions to intensify the punishments for drug crimes. The result was an enlargement of the population available for criminal justice processingââ¬â¢(Caplow and Simon, 1999, p71). It is crucial to acknowledge, therefore, that in any modern industrial society there is not a rudimentary causal link between a greater public desire for severity in criminal sanctions and a sustained growth in incarceration numbers; other conditions must be present. Specifically, ââ¬Ëa key condition is a large pool of offenders available to be imprisonedââ¬â¢(Caplow and Simon, 1999, p93). Although there had also been documented transient increases in the number of offenders committing nondrug crimes such as violent crime, property crime (larceny), and sex crime in modern societies during the 1980s, these numbers tended to fluctuate in cycles over time, and could not account for the continual rise in incarceration rates observed. In contrast, the number of drug crime offences had remained consistently high throughout the 1980s in virtually all developed countries that have experienced an incarceration boom. However, in most Western nations the total drug crime rate then started to steadily decline during the 1990s largely due to the much harsher punishments being imposed on drug crime offenders (both petty and serious) by the criminal justice systems in these states. One valid explanation for the persistently high rate of drug crime during the 1980s is the ââ¬Ëeconomic baseââ¬â¢ principle. Specifically, while the average monetary yield of larceny, violence and sex offences is very low, drug crime represents one of the only categories of felony where the potential financial returns are extremely high, and that provides a strong economic incentive for individuals living in poverty. Hence, drug smuggling and trafficking are the only illegal activities capable of providing a solid economic base for a large criminal population in modern society. The initial cost of goods is low and law enforcement efforts sustain high retail prices, thereby ensuring large profit margins (Reuter and Kleiman, 1986). Since the 1980s, drug crime has certainly been targeted by penal populist sentiments in many Western countries affected by a public expectation for greater punitiveness, largely irrespective of how the drug crime rate has subsequently changed in these developed nations, but it is evidently not the only category of felony that has become a common target of penal populism. Sex offences (especially against children), violent or abusive crimes (once again, even more so when the victims are children), and youth crime are three other important types of crime that in late modern capitalist states have characteristically become subjected to a public desire for penal excess. We shall examine in detail at a later stage below what these specific four categories of crime have in common and why they are such typical targets of penal populist sentiments in developed liberal societies. 4. The Increased Dependence of Governments on Crime Control as a Source of Popular Credibility The rapid proliferation of drug crime in many Western countries during the late 1970s and 1980s was accompanied by a great loss of public confidence in the social welfare programs implemented in these same nations. As Pratt (2007, p95) asserts, ââ¬Ëthe visible presence of drug addicts in these countries had become a symbol of misplaced welfarism and tolerance, now believed to be corroding their economic and social fabricsââ¬â¢. Furthermore, the short-lived growth of general crime waves in many modern societies during the late twentieth century led to a significant decline of public assurance in the competence of their respective governments to control the state. As one study remarks, ââ¬Ëthe international crime waves of the 1960s and 1970s helped diminish the prestige of national governments all over the industrial world, by calling into question their capacity to maintain social order. The increase of crime rates at a time of increasing government efforts to help the poor undermined many of the traditional arguments for welfare, and helped confirm the view of many conservatives that efforts to help the poor only made circumstances worse by eliminating incentives for self improvementââ¬â¢(Caplow and Simon, 1999, p88). It is difficult to determine whether the crime wave was caused by expansions in welfare programs or merely coincided with them. The main point is that in addition to the direct relationship between high rates of crime and demands for punitive governmental responses, the crime wave may have indirectly diminished the prestige of and public demand for welfare-oriented government (Caplow and Simon, 1999). Thus, it is argued that during the 1980s many Western governments shifted the priority of their domestic agendas away from welfare policies toward crime control policies. Initially, it was most often right wing conservative politicians that promoted ââ¬Ëtough on crimeââ¬â¢ punitive measures, making crime a political issue and gaining public support. However, Lappi-Seppà ¤là ¤ (2002, p92) suggests that mainstream opposition (i.e. left wing) parties are then forced into advocating punitive policies as well, because although these left wing parties want to ââ¬Ëdistance themselves from the populist programmes of the right wing movements, there is one area where they do not like to disagree ââ¬â the requirement of being ââ¬Ëtough on crimeââ¬â¢. No party seems to be willing to accuse another of exaggeration when it comes to measures against criminality. Being ââ¬Ësoft on crimeââ¬â¢ is an accusation that no [governmental party] wants to accept. And it is that fear of being softer than oneââ¬â¢s political opponents which tends to drive politicians, in the end, to the extremes of penal excessââ¬â¢. It is plausible to argue, therefore, that constant competition between opposing governmental factions for public favour in liberal democracies has created an ââ¬Ëpunitive arms raceââ¬â¢ of political opportunism, whereby each party is compelled to promote plus (when in power) implement increasingly more radical punitive policies ââ¬â irrespective of the actual level of crime that the country is experiencing ââ¬â in order to avoid appearing weak on crime and consequently losing valuable electoral votes to their political opponents who are prepared to be more severe on criminals. Clearly, such an opportunistic punitive arms race occurring within the governments of developed nations would lead to an exponential increase in the prison population numbers of these countries, and ultimately to prison overcrowding. That political mechanism may at least partly explain why so many Western countries which have experienced a large decrease in crime rates since the mid-1990s and into the early twenty-first century have still reported a rising prison population. For example, Pratt (2006, p1) observes that since 1999 Labour led coalition governments in New Zealand have strongly adhered to Britainââ¬â¢s New Labour ââ¬Ëapproach to crime and punishment, even using the famous phrase ââ¬Ëtough on crime, tough on the causes of crimeââ¬â¢ in its election manifestoes of 2002 and 2005. As a consequence, while [New Zealandââ¬â¢s] recorded crime rate has dropped by 25% in the last ten years, its imprisonment rate has increased to 189 per 100,000, one of the highest of Western countriesââ¬â¢. Yet it is not only the divisions (i.e. in terms of competing parties) within Western democratic governments that have catalysed the increased political focus on crime control, but also the growing number of divisions among the public itself. Indeed, modern society in many developed nations (such as the United Kingdom and the United States) has become increasingly heterogeneous since the late twentieth century, and consequently the number of bases of division within these societies has expanded. For example, the members of a diverse post-industrial society are not only partitioned along the traditional parameter of social class, but are also strongly divided by a number of dichotomous value-based issues that are characteristic of ââ¬Ëpost-materialistââ¬â¢ politics such as abortion, gay rights, animal rights (e.g. fox hunting), mass immigration, school prayer, and capital punishment where it still exists (Caplow and Simon, 1999). These value- or identity-based issues are intensely contested over in modern societies by well-organised pressure groups on either side of the bipolar political spectrum. These issues are bipolar or dichotomous in the sense that they are non-negotiable with no ââ¬Ëmiddle groundââ¬â¢; one either supports abortion rights or one opposes them. Hence, public division on these post-materialist issues is inevitable. One important consequence of the heterogeneous publics of Western countries becoming divided by such a multitude of value conflicts during the 1970s onward is that government parties had difficulty finding any issues to build successful election campaigns on that would appeal to a vast majority of the public. Harsher crime control appeared to be a clear choice as a singular issue that large sections of the modern public are united in consensus on. As is stated, ââ¬ËUnlike most values issues on the left or right, crime control seems to cut across the political spectrumPoliticians seeking to build viable majorities inevitably turn to the few issues that can bring people together in the new political landscapeThat is why election campaigns continue to focus on crime and punishment issues even when opposing candidates agree in their support of punitive anticrime measures. Faced with voters who split on so many issues and who are profoundly sceptical about the ability of government to improve their lives through welfare-oriented interventions, the mode of governing that commands the broadest support ââ¬â punitiveness toward criminal offenders ââ¬â is understandably [valued by governments]ââ¬â¢(Caplow and Simon, 1999, p83). Ultimately, therefore, while short-lived actual increases in crime rates during the late 1970s and 1980s may have initially triggered the rise in imprisonment rates in a number of developed countries, political opportunism (in the sense of governments capitalising on populist punitiveness) has arguably sustained the incarceration boom in virtually all Western nations affected by prison overcrowding, regardless of how those crime rates may have subsequently changed. 5. The Target Crimes of Penal Populism There is a high degree of uniformity across all Western nations that have experienced an incarceration surge over the past three decades in the types of crime that are most commonly subjected to strong public demand for harsh punitive sanctions. Generally, the four most frequent felony targets of penal populism are: Drug crime; Sex offences, especially when the victims are children; Child abuse (physical, sexual, or psychological), and; Youth crime. Correspondingly, these have also been some of the fastest growing segments of prison and boot camp populations in many developed countries during recent years. One fundamental property that the above four categories of crime have in common is that children are extremely vulnerable to the effects of all of them. We may validly question why children have come to occupy such a central place in the penal populist sentiments of modern industrial societies. Pratt (2007, p96) remarks that ââ¬Ëcrime control policy driven by penal populism targets ââ¬Ëothersââ¬â¢, not ordinary, ââ¬Ënormalââ¬â¢ peopleGiven the nature of populism, we should expect that crime control policy will gravitate towards easy and familiar targets, for whom there is likely to be the least public sympathy, the most social distance and the fewest authoritative voices (if any) to speak on their behalf: tho
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